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Limit Orders and Volatility in a Hybrid Market: The Island ECN 
Abstract 
This paper is an empirical analysis of trading activity on the Island ECN, an electronic 
communications network for US equities, which is organized as an electronic limit order 
book. The approach is cross-sectional across firms. The goal is to characterize the firm-
specific determinants of Island activity, with particular emphasis on the volatility of the 
firm’s stock. We find that Island’s market share for a given firm is positively related to 
the overall level of Nasdaq trading in the firm. Across a number of volatility proxies, we 
find that higher volatility is associated with 
• a lower proportion of limit orders in the incoming order flow 
• a higher probability of limit order execution 
• shorter expected time to execution 
• lower depth in the book.  
In addition, we find substantial use of hidden limit orders (for which the submitter has 
opted to forgo display of the order). Finally, over one quarter of the limit orders 
submitted to Island are canceled (unexecuted) within two seconds or less. The extensive 
use of these “fleeting” orders is at odds with the view that limit order traders (like 
dealers) are patient providers of liquidity.  
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1. Introduction 
The electronic limit order book has emerged as the most common form of security 
market organization worldwide. By choosing a market or limit order and selecting a limit 
price, an agent in such a market enjoys access to a range of strategies that trade off 
execution certainty against expected execution price. When the market has many 
participants, the collection of unexecuted limit orders (the book) may constitute a 
continuous source of liquidity, diminishing the role of professional intermediaries and 
maximizing direct interaction of the market’s users. The factors that influence an 
individual’s order choice and the aggregate properties of the limit order book are 
therefore of great interest.  
For a market organized as an electronic limit order book, the volatility of the 
traded security stands out as one of the most potentially important factors. To illuminate 
the connections between volatility and book behavior, the present paper undertakes a 
cross-sectional empirical analysis of the trading process on the Island ECN, an electronic 
limit order book for U. S. equities.  
The effects of volatility are complex and varied. For an individual trader 
contemplating the submission of a limit order, higher volatility will generally increase the 
probability of execution (a benefit), but may also increase the expected cost of getting 
picked off by a counterparty with better information and the expected cost of chasing a 
price that has moved away (see Angel (1994) and Harris (1998)). The source or type of 
volatility may matter. While execution probability may simply depend on overall 
volatility, the risk of getting picked off may be more properly measured by the trade-
driven component of volatility. In moving from the individual choice problem to 
characterization of the equilibrium, additional interactions arise. For example, increased 
use of limit orders implies fewer market orders, and a consequent drop in the expected 
execution rate of the submitted limit orders, decreasing their desirability (Foucault 
(1999)).  
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It is also reasonable to conjecture causal effects running from characteristics of 
the trading mechanism to volatility. For example, holding constant the incoming flow of 
market orders, a deep book, i.e., one with large quantities at successive price levels, will 
exhibit smaller price changes than a thin book (Domowitz and Wang (1994)). This 
motivates a distinction between “true value”  volatility (which derives from an asset’s 
fundamentals) and market price volatility (which impounds effects of the trading 
mechanism).  
We use a cross-sectional approach to analyze the effects of true value and market 
price volatility in typical limit order market. The Island ECN is one component of the 
Nasdaq stock market. 1 The market share of Island for the average stock in our sample is 
3.5% in terms of share volume and 6.2% in terms of trades. 2  Two ECNs (Island and 
Instinet) dominate Nasdaq non-dealer trading. Whereas order submission in Instinet is 
limited to institutions, however, Island is heavily used by retail investors.  
That Island’s market share falls far short of dominating overall Nasdaq activity 
affects our analysis in several ways. Some of our conjectures derive from models in 
which the electronic book constitutes the entire market. In applying these models to a 
hybrid market, we are extending the implications of these models beyond their original 
formal scope. On the other hand, Island’s small market share helps justify the assumption 
that overall price determination and overall Nasdaq trading activity are exogenous with 
respect to measures of Island activity. It therefore lessens concerns about reverse 
causality in our econometric specifications.  
For each stock in our sample, we examine the trading activity of investors on 
Island using three types of measures. First, we look at the manifestations of the trading 
                                                 
1 In US securities law, an ECN (Electronic Communications Network) is a medium for 
disseminating (“publishing”) quotes (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (1996)). 
Because it offers executions, Island is also classified as an Alternative Trading System 
(ATS, US Securities and Exchange Commission (1998)). 
2 More recently, Island claims an overall Nasdaq share of 16.2% by trades and 7.6% by 
volume for June 2001 (Island (2001)). 
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strategies of investors by investigating measures of the flow of orders through the market: 
the proportion of limit orders in the order flow (the reminder are market orders), and the 
proportion of limit orders that are filled (the remainder are canceled or expire). Second, 
we examine average depths in the book that can be viewed as Island’s supply and 
demand curves. These quantities are, of course, simply the accumulations of all limit 
order submissions, executions and cancellations at each price, but they conveniently 
summarize the steady state of the system. Third, we conduct a duration analysis of times 
to fill or cancel for limit orders. This characterizes the speed in real (wall-clock) time of 
the market’s dynamics.  
We then investigate the relation between Island’s measures and the various 
measures of volatility that have arisen in the discussion above: total, permanent, 
systematic, unsystematic and trade-driven. We generally find that across all measures, 
higher volatility is associated with: 
• a lower proportion of limit orders in the incoming order flow 
• a higher probability of limit order execution 
• shorter expected time to execution 
• lower depth in the book.  
These results confirm many of the direct effects present in the economic models of 
individual order strategy. They suggest that the offsetting effects hypothesized to arise in 
equilibrium are not large.  
In addition, we examine how characteristics of the investor clientele, the 
percentage of shares held by institutions and the activity of odd-lot traders, relate to the 
Island measures. We find that that institutional ownership is positively related to the limit 
order submission proportion, and the proportion of limit orders priced at the quote or 
better, but negatively related to the proportion of limit orders priced behind (away from) 
the quote. This suggests that while institutions may favor limit orders, they do not 
contribute to depth away from the market.  
Like many other electronic markets, Island permits undisclosed (also called 
hidden, invisible or “iceberg”) orders. Our data support a partial characterization of such 
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orders. We also examine an issue that is of particular interest to understanding the 
electronic limit order book, the phenomenon of “fleeting” limit orders, i.e., orders that are 
canceled almost immediately after submission. These constitute a substantial portion of 
the order flow in many stocks and their characterization is important to understanding 
this market structure. Finally, we look at Island’s market share and how it relates to the 
volatility and investor measures, as well as to the presence of Island at the inside quote on 
Nasdaq.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review prior studies. 
Section 3 describes the Island system. Sample construction and data sources are 
discussed in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the econometric specifications. Results are 
presented in Section 6. Section 7 documents the importance on the Island system of 
hidden and “fleeting” limit orders, i.e., orders canceled almost immediately after 
submission. Section 8 provides an analysis of Island’s market share. A summary 
concludes the paper in Section 9.  
2. Literature survey 
The large and growing importance of electronic limit order book systems in many 
securities markets has engendered much interest. In the following survey, we concentrate 
initially on the theoretical literature, with a view toward establishing relevant empirical 
predictions. We then highlight prior empirical work related to our analysis. Our 
discussion focuses on “volatility,” but we note at the outset that meaning and usage of the 
term varies considerably across this literature.  
a. Theoretical models 
From one perspective, an agent who places a limit order is acting as a dealer. 
Models of dealer behavior are therefore useful, especially those featuring asymmetric 
information (beginning with Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom (1985) 
and Easley and O'Hara (1987), and extending to many others). Building on this view, 
Glosten (1994) models a market organized as a consolidated limit order book. Seppi 
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(1997) and Rock (1990) consider the interplay between the book and a strategic dealer 
(specialist) who possesses a last mover advantage. Parlour and Seppi (2001) examine 
competition between one trading venue organized as a pure electronic book and one 
constituted as a book/dealer hybrid.  
These models generally maintain that the information content of the incoming 
market order flow is an important determinant of how aggressively a dealer will quote or 
how much liquidity will be supplied in the book. The analyses imply that an order flow 
characterized by a relatively high proportion of privately-informed traders will lead to a 
wider spread and smaller quantities available for sale or purchase at each price in the 
book. The present paper investigates this relation.  
These models generally feature a sharp distinction between liquidity suppliers 
(limit order traders and dealers) and liquidity demanders (market order traders). The book 
fills to the point where no agent wishes to submit an additional limit order or to cancel an 
existing one. The dynamics of limit order arrivals are not explicitly modeled. The filling 
is assumed to occur instantaneously, or at least prior to the time at which a market order 
can arrive. For this reason, these models are sometimes described as static.  
In reality, of course, an agent’s role is often a matter of choice. An arriving trader 
makes the decision of whether and when to be a liquidity supplier (with a limit order) or a 
demander (with a market order). The practical importance of this decision motivates 
analysis of an agent’s optimal order strategy.  
 In Cohen et al. (1981) agents are characterized by endowments and subjective 
assessments of the security’s value and make choices between submitting market and 
limit orders. The model demonstrates the tradeoff between execution uncertainty and the 
cost of trading. Angel (1994) and Harris (1998) provide partial equilibrium models that 
analyze the optimal choice between market and limit orders and relate it to various 
factors in the economic environment. Some empirical implications of these models are 
intuitively clear:  limit orders are more likely to be submitted if the spread is large (i.e., 
that the contra-side quote is distant) and the arrival rate of market orders is high.  
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The role of volatility in these models is more complex. Higher volatility generally 
increases the probability that a limit order will execute. This may be illustrated with the 
simple model suggested by Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997). A limit order is placed 
away from the current market price. It fills when the limit price is first met. This is 
formally the first passage time to the (limit price) barrier. If the security price follows a 
diffusion process with zero drift and variance per unit time σ2, then the probability of an 
execution in any finite time increases with σ and converges to one (certainty) as time 
approaches infinity. Although this simple view suggests the direction of the effect, Lo, 
MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997) note that it leads to poor predictions of actual execution 
times.  
The option perspective on limit orders, on the other hand, suggests that volatility 
is costly. The limit order is more likely to be picked off when the “true value” of the 
security has changed in such a way as to make it mispriced (say the value of the security 
increased above the price of a limit sell order). This pick-off risk is similar to the private 
information risk faced by a dealer in the sequential trade models. In a limit order context, 
however, the exposure can arise from information that might otherwise be considered 
public (e. g. , a news release). The risk arises to the extent that the limit order can’t be 
revised or canceled before the arrival of a market order.  
Finally, higher volatility increases the expected distance that the price can move 
away from the order, decreasing its chances of ever executing. An agent who needs to 
complete the trade must chase the price, and perhaps ultimately enter a market order.  
In Angel (1994)’s model, a buyer attempts to minimize the expected purchase 
price subject to the requirement of trade completion within a given time. There is no 
penalty for being picked off. With this consideration eliminated, Angel’s numerical 
simulations suggest that the beneficial effect of volatility on execution probability 
outweighs the expected cost of chasing a price that has moved away. In all, volatility 
encourages use of limit orders. On the other hand, the objective function in Harris 
(1998)’s model does penalize bad fills. Here, the option effect dominates, implying that 
higher volatility makes limit orders less attractive.  
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Harris shows that a strategic trader who derives private value from a completed 
trade will use more aggressive limit orders than a risk-neutral liquidity trader, i.e., an 
agent who is closer to a dealer in the sequential trade models. The strategic traders, 
therefore, may determine the marginal prices and quantities in the book. This behavior 
also arises in Chakravarty and Holden (1995), where informed traders use limit orders to 
undercut the dealer’s quotes.  
Dynamic equilibrium is the focus in Parlour (1998), Foucault (1999) and 
Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2001). In these models, agents arrive sequentially and 
choose between market and limit orders. Their optimal strategies are conditioned on 
conjectures of other traders’ optimal strategies. To make the analyses tractable, traders’ 
problems and strategies are constrained. While traders have diverse private values, for 
example, none possess private information. More importantly, however, the agents are 
limited to one action in the market. They can’t revise or cancel their orders and the time-
in-force for a limit order is either one period or infinite. This rules out many of the 
dynamic strategies available to agents in Angel (1994) or Harris (1998).  
The empirical predictions of the dynamic models typically involve transition 
probabilities or relative occurrences of events. Foucault (1999) provides the most definite 
empirical predictions concerning volatility. In his model the relevant volatility measure is 
that of fundamental (“true”) value, rather than market price volatility. An agent’s order 
choice is most immediately affected by the pick-off risk. An increase in volatility causes 
a trader who uses a limit order to price the order less aggressively. This causes an 
increase in the spread. The cost of using a market order rises, favoring a shift to limit 
orders. Thus, volatility should increase the proportion of limit orders, and decrease the fill 
(execution) rate of these orders.  
Domowitz and Wang (1994) examine the behavior of a limit order market in 
which orders arrive at various price levels with Poisson intensities that are partially 
endogenous. A general decrease in the arrival rates causes a drop in book depth and 
increases in volatility in quoted and transaction prices, and also an increase in the rate of 
market failure (intervals where the book is empty). Due to this mechanism, the model 
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implies associations between volatility and properties of the book. The book in this 
model, however, generally achieves a stationary limiting distribution, which is 
incompatible with a diffusion process for the fundamental asset value. Accordingly, 
volatility in this framework derives solely from disturbances that are transitory (such as 
bid-ask bounce).  
b. Empirical studies 
Economic logic suggests that since limit orders forgo immediate execution, they 
should realize a cost advantage (on average) relative to market orders. Harris and 
Hasbrouck (1996) find this to be the case in a sample of NYSE orders. Investigating 
simulated strategies imposed on actual data, Handa and Schwartz (1996) find that when 
the costs of nonexecution are ignored (an assumption applicable to patient traders), the 
returns to limit orders are positive.  
Harris (1998) notes that limit orders are priced more aggressively by liquidity 
traders nearing their trade completion deadline and by informed traders with stronger 
signals. By implication, both agents would be more aggressive than a dealer who is 
uninformed and indifferent to trade completion. 3  Chung, Van Ness, and Van Ness 
(1999) find that bid and ask quotes on the NYSE frequently represent the book instead of 
the specialist. Harris and Panchapagesan (1999) conclude that the state of the book is 
informative, in the sense of predicting future short-term (though not long-term) price 
movements.  
A number of studies examine various features of markets organized primarily as 
consolidated limit order books. Among these studies, Sandas (1999) constitutes the sole 
empirical characterization of a limit order book in the equilibrium characterized by 
Glosten (1994). The results suggest that the book on the Swedish Stock Exchange 
                                                 
3 A dealer nearing the close of a trading session with an inventory imbalance, however, 
may more closely resemble a liquidity trader subject to a completion deadline. Consistent 
with this supposition, Chan, Christie, and Schultz (1995) find that Nasdaq quotes narrow 
toward the end of the day. 
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provides less liquidity than would be predicted on the basis of the information in the 
order flow. For incoming buy orders, for example, the supply curve is too steep relative 
to the price revisions that these orders ultimately cause.  
Other studies characterize the incoming order mix. A positive relation between 
the prevailing spread and the probability that an incoming order is a limit order is found 
on the Paris Bourse (Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995)), the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(Griffiths et al. (2000)) and for an anonymous Nasdaq wholesaler (Smith (2000)). These 
findings are consistent with the predictions of the order strategy models.  
The evidence on volatility is mixed. Ahn, Bae, and Chan (2001) examine 
transitory volatility on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. They measure volatility over 15-
minute intervals and find that depth on the book rises subsequent to a volatility shock. On 
the other hand, Coppejans (2001) find that a volatility shock reduces depth. Goldstein and 
Kavajecz (2000) note that during the October 1997 break, book depth declined 
dramatically.  
Although some of these studies employ cross-sectional variables, they generally 
investigate variation over time. 4  The present paper employs a cross-sectional (across 
firm) perspective, which is particularly appropriate for investigating the attributes of 
firms that are related to the behavior of the book. Some of these attributes, and volatility 
is certainly one of them, also exhibit time-series variation; but even in these cases, it 
cannot be presumed that the cross-sectional and dynamic relations are the same. In fact, it 
is much more reasonable to examine the implications on the book of  “true value” 
volatility using a cross-sectional rather than a time-series specification.  
 Time, in the formal analyses of limit orders, is primarily a notional construct. It 
typically indexes the sequence of agents’ moves, rather than the passage of real (“wall 
                                                 
4 Griffiths et al. (2000) examine firm size as a determinant of order aggressiveness. In 
similar specifications, Smith (2000) includes price and volatility. 
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clock”) time. 5  It is nevertheless clear that in actual trading situations, real time may play 
a more distinctive role, due to institutional features (such as regular trading hours), 
decision cycles or monitoring costs that are measured in clock time. In limit order 
analyses, real time effects have been studied using duration models to characterize the 
time-to-fill or time-to-cancel of an order (Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997) and Cho and 
Nelling (2000)). If time were important solely as a volatility scale factor, a duration 
model would have a simple form, an accelerated failure time representation with 
volatility (per unit time) as the only important determinant. In fact, numerous other firm 
and market variables contribute explanatory power, suggesting a more complex 
relationship. For these reasons, the relation between duration and volatility is investigated 
in the present study.  
Other ECN-related papers examine quotes or trades, but do not have the order-
level data that we use in this paper: Huang (2000) investigates the contribution of ECN's 
to price discovery for the ten most actively traded NASDAQ stocks; Simaan, Weaver, 
and Whitcomb (1998) examine the behavior of market makers and ECN’s following the 
tick size change to sixteenths; Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001) examine institutional 
trading costs on ECN’s and crossing systems; and Barclay, Hendershott, and McCormick 
(2001) compare execution costs between ECN's and market makers.  
3. The Island ECN: Background and trading protocol 
Since this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first academic study of the Island 
ECN, it is worthwhile to document the system and data. The Island ECN was founded in 
1996 and began operating on January 1997, becoming one of the two largest ECN’s in 
the market today in terms of both share volume and number of traders (the other major 
ECN is Instinet). In terms of market share, about 11% of the trades in Nasdaq stocks were 
executed on Island during our sample period (the last quarter of 1999), representing close 
                                                 
5 The distinction between real time and event or “informational” time is a recurring theme 
in studies of financial markets (see Clark (1973) and Russell and Engle (1998), for 
example). 
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to 6% of Nasdaq’s volume. The disparity between the market share in terms of trades and 
share volume testifies to the small size of most Island trades. In addition, Island’s market 
share is not the same for all stocks, and seems to be higher for a small number of very 
active stocks. The market share of the average stock in our sample (that is comprised of 
the top 300 Nasdaq firms by market capitalization) is 6.23% in terms of trades and 3.52% 
in terms of share volume.  
Island operates a pure agency market. The system is active (i.e., orders can be 
submitted and trades can take place) from 7:00 in the morning to 8:00 in the evening. 6 
Island accepts only priced limit orders. Market orders as such are not accepted. A trader 
who seeks immediate execution must submit an order at a limit price that meets or 
crosses the best opposing price (a marketable limit order). Each time a limit order is 
received and the book contains a matching order, the limit order is immediately executed. 
If there is no matching order, the limit order is placed in the book until a matching order 
is received or the limit order is canceled.  
All orders are matched based on strict price-time priority without regard to the 
number of shares in the order. The Island display is anonymous—the identities of the 
investor or the broker are not visible—with only the price and the number of shares made 
available to the market. Island’s top orders are also represented in the Nasdaq quote 
montage, and are therefore incorporated into National Best Bid/Offer (NBBO) display.  
An unmatched limit order is normally displayed. That is, the price and size of the 
order are visible to Island subscribers. At the trader’s discretion, however, display may be 
limited to Island subscribers or suppressed entirely. In neither of these cases is the order 
incorporated into the montage or NBBO.  
Since Nasdaq forbids locking or crossing their market, subscriber-only orders are 
a convenient way of attempting to buy or sell a stock outside the Nasdaq quote without 
                                                 
6 During our sample period, Island offered a continuous session from 8:00 a.m. to 8:00 
p.m. 
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violating Nasdaq rules. 7 The display requirements of SEC’s Regulation ATS dictate that 
if an ECN executes more than five percent of the total volume in a given stock during 
four out of the last six months, then the ECN is large enough that it should be required to 
display all its visible orders to the public marketplace. Island does not accept subscriber-
only orders in the list of stocks that are subject to the ATS display requirements. This 
regulation does not apply to invisible orders because they are not seen on the Island book.  
A subscriber can also specify the minimum number of shares of an order that can 
be executed. This feature is primarily aimed at subscribers who do not want to get odd-lot 
executions. However, orders that specify a minimum number of shares that is higher than 
100 are not reflected in Island's quote on Nasdaq. An order that either specifies a 
minimum number of shares or is invisible has a lower priority than an order that is not 
restricted in these two ways. The lower priority means that if an order with a restriction is 
entered before an unrestricted order at the same price, the unrestricted order will execute 
first (i.e., restricted orders lose time priority).  
An Island subscriber can submit limit orders without charge. If a limit order sits in 
the book and subsequently is executed by an incoming order, it is considered to have 
added liquidity to the book, and the subscriber receives a 0.1 cent rebate per executed 
share. The incoming order that removed liquidity from the Island book is charged 0.25 
cent per executed share. While Island subscribers pay a fee for getting a data feed that 
allows complete construction of the book in real time, anyone with an Internet browser 
can observe the top 15 orders on each side of the book (for any stock) in real time on 
Island's web site.  
                                                 
7 Island operates solely as an agency market that automatically executes matching buy 
and sell interest, irrespective of quotes displayed by other market participants. Hence, 
routing an order to Island does not guarantee receiving the best price in the market. Island 
maintains that it is the subscriber’s responsibility to ensure best execution for their 
transactions by selecting the appropriate market venue. Also, subscribers bare sole 
responsibility to complying with Nasdaq’s short sale rule, as Island does not check orders 
or executions to ensure compliance with the rule. The Island system is programmed to 
comply with the SEC short sale rule for NYSE-listed securities. 
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4. Sample and data 
a. Sample construction and descriptive statistics 
The sample was drawn from all Nasdaq National Market common stocks with 
data in the CRSP database from October 1 to December 31, 1999. 8  The sample is the 
300 largest firms based on equity market capitalization as of September 30, 1999. 9  
Table 1 presents summary statistics. The smallest firm has an average market 
capitalization over the sample period of 824 million dollars, while the median firm is just 
over 3 billion dollars and the largest firm is close to 495 billion dollars. The sample also 
spans a range of trading activity and price levels. The most active firm has a daily 
average of 28,654 trades, while the median firm has about 1,066 trades on an average 
day, and the least actively traded firm in the sample has (on average) only 16 trades per 
day. Average daily CRSP closing prices range from $8.40 to $326.58, with a median of 
$45.66. To provide a sense of the cross-sectional characteristics of the variables, we 
report means for subsamples constructed by ranking on market capitalization, average 
number of daily trades and standard deviation of daily returns, σr.  
To characterize the trading clientele for the firms, we examine the level of 
institutional holdings from the Value Line Investment Survey. This ranges from 6.02% to 
97.93%, with a median (and mean) of  51%. As a proxy for overall level of trading 
activity, we use daily turnover (the ratio of the day’s volume to the number of shares 
outstanding), and take the median of this over our sample. To measure retail investor 
                                                 
8 The Nasdaq Stock Market is comprised of two separate market categories—Nasdaq 
National Market (NNM) and Nasdaq SmallCap Market (SCM). The two market 
categories differ mainly with respect to the listing requirements (but also with respect to a 
few details of trading protocol). The NNM has stricter listing requirements and generally 
includes larger firms. 
9 We also required that firms do not have more than one series of common stocks traded. 
Two firms (Associated Group Inc. and Molex Inc.) were excluded from the sample on 
this basis. We also excluded Comair Holdings Inc., which was in the process of being 
acquired by Delta Air Lines during the sample period.  
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activity we use the daily average number of odd-lot trades provided to us by the NASD’s 
Economic Research. The range of this quantity is from 19.81 odd-lot trades per day up to 
8,348.22, with a median of just over 125. 10 
b. Island data and statistics 
The data supplied by Island are identical to those supplied in real time to Island 
subscribers. These data comprise time-sequenced messages that completely describe the 
history of trade and book activity. The process may be summarized as follows. When a 
arriving order can be matched (in whole or part) against an existing order in the book, the 
system sends an Order Execution message. If all or part of the order can’t be matched, the 
system sends an Add Order [to the book] message. An Add Order message contains the 
direction (buy or sell), number of shares, limit price, a display condition (normal or 
subscriber-only), and a unique identification number. If and when the order is executed, 
this number is reported in the Order Execution message. When an existing order is 
canceled or modified (in size), the system generates a Cancel Order message. The book, 
excepting the invisible orders, may be constructed by cumulating these messages from 
the start of the day onwards. Although the arrival time and quantity of an invisible order 
are never made available, the execution of an invisible order is signaled by a special trade 
message. In the rare event that a previous trade report was in error, the system sends a 
Broken Trade message.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the number and sizes of orders that arrive 
to Island. We only consider data from the regular trading session of the Nasdaq Stock 
Market (from 9:30 a. m. to 4:00 p. m. ). This was done to ensure that we are indeed 
looking at the Island system only when it is part of a much larger market and captures a 
relatively small fraction of the order flow and not when it is the one of a handful of 
                                                 
10 The reason that the minimum AvgTrd from CRSP can be 15.73 while the minimum 
OddTrd can be 19.81 is that odd-lot trades are not reported to the tape, and are therefore 
not counted in the CRSP number (nor do they appear for that matter in the TAQ or 
NASTRAQ databases). 
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venues for trading during pre-opening and after-market hours. The average number of 
daily limit orders increases with market capitalization (in the ranked group means), 
average daily trades, and σr. The average size of limit orders on Island is 572 shares, 
testifying to the retail nature of trading on the system. The average size decreases slightly 
across capitalization and average trade subsamples, which may suggest that retail activity 
is more concentrated in the largest, most active Nasdaq stocks.  
The Island system does not accept unpriced market orders. Traders seeking 
immediate execution must enter a limit price at or better than the opposing quote (e. g. , a 
limit order to buy at the ask). Although these orders are formally marketable limit orders, 
we will henceforth consider them to be market orders. Table 2 shows that market orders 
tend to be smaller than limit orders, with a mean of only 335 shares. As with limit orders, 
the average size decreases with market capitalization and trading activity.  
Nasdaq and Island trading activity is illustrated in Figure 1. For both Nasdaq and 
Island, activity is concentrated in the higher market capitalization deciles. Figure 2 
describes Island’s orders across market capitalization deciles. Limit orders outnumber 
market orders. Most limit orders are priced away from (less aggressively than) Island’s 
quote.  
c. Constructed Island variables 
The observable variables that are closest to their counterparts in the theoretical 
models are the number of limit orders submitted (as a proportion of the total, limit and 
market orders), and their execution proportions. It is also interesting and useful to 
characterize the aggressiveness of the limit orders. Accordingly, we examine the number 
of limit orders priced at Island’s quote or better, e. g. , buy orders priced at Island’s bid or 
better, and those less aggressive orders priced behind Island’s quote. We also compute 
similar statistics based on the number of shares in the orders.  
Table 3 presents summary statistics on the submission proportions. First note that 
most of the order submissions are limit orders: a median of 82% (by number of orders), 
and 89% (by number of shares). In the ranked subsample means these proportions 
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decrease with capitalization, average number of trades, and σr. This behavior also 
characterizes the more aggressive limit orders (priced at or better than Island’s quote). 
The reverse is true, however, for the less aggressive limit orders. That is, as 
capitalization, average number of trades, and σr increase, traders tend to submit less 
aggressive limit orders. Proportions defined in terms of shares behave in a similar 
fashion.  
Table 3 also presents summary statistics for execution proportions. 11  The mean 
execution rate is 18% (by orders) and 13% (by shares). In the subgroup means, the 
execution rates increase with market capitalization, average number of trades, and σr. 
Surprisingly, execution rates for more aggressive orders (those priced at the quote or 
better) are generally lower than the execution rates for less aggressive orders (behind the 
quote). There are a number of considerations that could potentially account for this, 
notably strategic order management. In particular, many of the more aggressive orders 
are canceled after one or two seconds, thus depriving them of the chance for execution. 
We discuss this behavior more extensively in Section 7.  
The second type of analysis we provide is that of depth in the book. We construct 
a snapshot of the ask side of the book at five minute intervals by recording the cumulative 
dollar depth at $1/16 intervals, ranging from $0.50 better than the National Best Offer 
(NBO) up to $5.00 worse than the NBO (88 groups, with the last group including “$5 or 
higher”). We construct similar snapshots on the bid side. As an example, Figure 3 
presents a box-plot summary of the ask depth snapshots for Microsoft. The length of the 
boxes and “whiskers” for each interval is large, which indicates substantial variation in 
depth over time. The mean ask-side depth for Microsoft is $4,416,000; the standard 
deviation is $2,130,000, implying a coefficient of variation slightly above two.  
                                                 
11 Note that execution proportions cannot simply be defined as the number of market 
orders over the number of limit orders due to the difference in size between market and 
limit orders (limit orders are larger on average than market orders). We are able to follow 
each limit order that enters the system and therefore can produce an exact 
characterization of the execution proportion of orders. 
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Our cross-sectional analysis requires a summary measure of book depth for each 
firm. The most obvious measure is simply the mean (over time) of the total dollar value 
of the orders on the ask and bid sides. We computed this, but also estimated quadratic 
polynomial functions. The final results were substantially similar whether the summary 
measure was total dollar value, the intercept in the quadratic fit, or the slope coefficient. 
(The quadratic coefficient was small and variable. )   Similar results were also obtained 
when the depth snapshots were measured in shares, and also when the interval widths 
were specified as a fraction of the average stock price. Accordingly, we report results 
only for total dollar value of orders. The cross-sectional analysis of these measures is 
performed using regression specifications parallel to those used for the order proportions 
discussed above.  
Table 5 presents summary statistics (across firms) for mean total dollar depth. The 
mean coefficient of variation is roughly one, suggesting substantial time variation in 
depth for most firms. The standard deviation (across firms) of mean dollar depth is also 
relatively high, which indicates variation across firms. The patterns across market 
capitalization-ranked groups and trade-ranked groups conform to expectations. Larger 
and more actively traded firms have deeper books. Within the standard deviation-ranked 
groups, however, depth is not monotonic.  
The third Island characteristic investigated in this paper is the timing of order 
events, and in particular the (elapsed) time between an order’s submission and its first 
fill. We will refer to this duration simply as time to execution. In contrast to the 
proportions and depths discussed above, there is no convenient firm-specific summary 
statistic for this variable. Since many limit orders are canceled or expire unexecuted, the 
average duration of executed orders is an optimistic (unrealistically low) indication of 
what the submitter of a limit order should expect. The analysis therefore relies directly on 
individual limit orders, without an intermediate aggregation at the firm level.  
This reliance leads to two difficulties. First, the number of observations becomes 
unworkably large. To deal with this, we employed for each firm a maximum of 2,000 
orders (a time-stratified sample drawn from the all of the firm’s orders). The second 
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difficulty is that a modest number of firms did not have 2,000 orders in the sample. For 
the duration models, each observation is weighted  by the inverse of the number of 
observations for the firm. This procedure effectively weights firms equally.  
Figure 4 depicts “failure” functions for executions and cancellations. Intuitively, 
the failure function is the cumulative probability of event occurrence. Both executions 
and cancellations are of interest, so our treatment of the two types of events is symmetric. 
Specifically, in applying the (standard) Kaplan-Meier correction, cancellation is treated 
as censoring in the execution estimation, execution is treated as censoring in the 
cancellation estimation. These functions are not adjusted to correctly weight firms with 
fewer that 2,000 observations; such firms are effectively underweighted. The time scale is 
nonlinear (to show detail for smaller times).  
The cumulative execution probability rises fairly slowly, reaching approximately 
70% at two hours. The function is almost certainly biased upwards. The standard 
framework assumes that the censoring process is independent of the event process. In the 
present case, this is tantamount to assuming that a limit order that is canceled has the 
same probability of execution (going forward) as an order that isn’t canceled. It is 
violated, for example, if traders are more likely to cancel limit orders when the price has 
moved away after submission.  
The cumulative cancellation probability exhibits two notable features. Most 
strikingly, a large number of limit orders are canceled very shortly after their submission. 
Roughly 25% have been canceled after two seconds, and about 40% after ten seconds. 12   
This is inconsistent with the traditional view of a limit order as providing ongoing 
liquidity. We describe limit orders canceled shortly after execution as “fleeting”, and 
discuss them in Section 7. The second interesting feature is the existence of two relatively 
sharp jumps in the cancellation function, at exactly three and five minutes. The Island 
                                                 
12 Like the execution probability function, the cancellation function is biased upwards, 
but since price movements over ten seconds tend to be small, the bias at this end of the 
time scale is likely to be small. 
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protocol allows traders to specify a time-in-force for the order. Apparently three and five 
minutes are frequent choices.  
d. Volatility measures 
The literature surveyed above suggests a central role for volatility. Different 
models, however, use the term to characterize different concepts. We consequently 
employ multiple measures in the empirical analysis. Table 4 presents summary statistics 
for these measures.  
The first volatility measure is simply the return standard deviation, introduced 
above as σr. A sensible refinement of this variable involves differentiation between 
systematic and unsystematic volatility. This distinction may be important for the usual 
reason (in many asset pricing models, only the systematic risk that is priced). In the 
present situation, however, systematic volatility may also proxy for trading risk that is 
relatively easy to hedge. An indexed portfolio manager who needs to invest in stocks, for 
example, might initially enter into a long futures position, and then purchase the 
individual stocks over time (reducing the futures position commensurately).  
Our measures of systematic and unsystematic risk are based on the market model: 
 , (1) it i i Mt itr rα β= + + e
where rMt is the CRSP value-weighted portfolio return. The specification is estimated 
using three prior years of daily data (from October 1, 1996 to September  30, 1999). Data 
limitations restricted these estimations to 211 firms. Our proxy for the systematic risk for 
firm i is ; unsystematic risk is .  i Mβ σ ( )iteσ
The volatility measures discussed to this point are derived from transaction prices. 
They therefore impound trading-induced price movements, such as bid-ask bounce. 
Noting this, Foucault (1999) suggests that long-run volatility (estimated using the 
Hasbrouck (1991) procedure) is the preferred measure. From intraday TAQ data 
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aggregated at a one-minute frequency, we estimate a vector autoregression (VAR). 13  
The VAR estimates may be transformed to yield the variance of the random-walk 
component of the security price, . We use the standard deviation, σ2wσ w, scaled up by a 
factor of 6.5 60×  to reflect volatility over a 6. 5 hour trading day.  
Table 4 shows that the estimated mean of σw is lower than that of σr in the total 
sample and all subsample groupings. There are two likely explanations for this. First, σr 
includes the overnight period, while σw does not. In the present case, this is a point in 
favor of σw, since the limit order book is primarily active during regular trading hours. 
Second, σw has been purged of transient volatility.  
The VAR also supports a decomposition of the random-walk variance: 
, where the two terms on the left derive respectively from return 
innovations and signed trade innovations. We employ σ
2 2 2
,w w r wσ σ σ= + ,x
                                                
w,x, which reflects the 
contribution to permanent changes in the security price that can be attributed to new trade 
information, while σw,r is the remaining portion (due to return innovations). Table 4 
reports summary statistics for these measures. On average, about one-quarter of the 
random-walk volatility is due to signed trades.  
It was noted in the literature summary that volatility enters some limit order 
models as a determinant of the likelihood that an agent using a limit order will have to 
“chase” a moving market. For these agents, typified by Angel’s buyer and Harris’s 
motivated trader, volatility increases the aggressiveness of their order strategies. In this 
view, the source of volatility is not important, and a total volatility measure such as σr or 
 
13 The details of the procedures are as follows. All variables are one-minute time-
aggregates: rt is the change in the logarithm of the NBBO midpoint at the close of the 
minute; xt is the sum of the trade volume, wherein each trade volume is signed by 
reference to the midpoint of the quote immediately preceding the trade; Sign(xt) is +1 if 
xt>0; –1 if xt<0; and, 0 if xt=0. xt1/2 is the sum of the signed square-roots of the trade 
volumes. The VAR comprises the variables {rt, Sign(xt), xt, xt1/2}, with first and second 
lags included. The model allows contemporaneous effects running from the trade 
variables to returns. 
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σw is appropriate. A trade-driven volatility measure, however, may be a more appropriate 
measure of pick-off risk.  
5. Specifications 
Corresponding to the three sorts of Island variables (execution and submission 
proportions, depths and times to execution), this study estimates three types of cross-
sectional specifications. Each specification features a linear regression in which the 
regressors are the firm-specific variables. This commonality facilitates the presentation 
and discussion of results. The actual statistical models and their underlying assumptions 
are varied.  
The analyses of the submission proportions, execution proportions and depths are 
conducted in two steps. For a proportion, we regress the overall estimate for each firm 
against the firm-specific variables. To deal with the restricted range of the proportions 
(between zero and one, inclusive), the proportions were first transformed by the logit 
function ( ) ( )log 1f x x x= − 
                                                
 for 0<x<1. (Observations for which x=0 or 1 were 
deleted. ). For the depth analyses, we compute the mean total dollar depth for each firm, 
which is then used as a dependent variable in the regression specification. It is important 
to note that these procedures effectively weight all firms equally. All regressions are 
estimated using OLS with White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 14   
The analyses of time to execution are conducted in one step, i.e., without first 
constructing summary measures at the firm level. The data here consist of individual 
orders (up to 2,000 for each firm). This motivates a duration analysis of the sort 
suggested by Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997). Specifically, we employ an accelerated 
failure time model, wherein the logarithm of the time to execution is modeled as a linear 
function of the explanatory variables. Limit orders that are canceled or expire correspond 
 
14 For regression specifications (except the duration models), we also used two-stage 
Least Trimmed Squares (see Rousseeuw and Leroy (1987)) to examine whether our 
results are affected by outliers. The results were almost identical to the OLS results, and 
are therefore omitted from the presentation in the paper. 
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to censored observations. 15  To maintain equal-firm weighting, we use the following 
procedure. Denote by ni the number of observations (limit orders) for firm i. Since 
ni<2,000 for some firms, we weight each observation by 1/ni.  
In each estimation we include as regressors, in addition to the volatility measures, 
a standard set of three control variables: the log of the average market capitalization; the 
average price per share; and, the log of the median daily turnover. Among other things, 
capitalization controls for agents’ general beliefs about holding and trading 
characteristics of the firm. The average price is included to pick up discreteness effects in 
the price grid. Median turnover is intended to control for the market-wide "normal" level 
of trading in the stock. The median is used instead of the mean in order to have a measure 
of the typical trading intensity in a stock that is less sensitive to information shocks.  
Many of the variables we seek to model (e. g. , limit order execution rates), as 
well as many of our explanatory variables (such as turnover) are derived from trading 
data over the same sample period. This raises the possibility of simultaneity (causal 
effects running from the modeled variable to the explanatory variables) or correlated 
measurement errors. Our modeled variables, however, are derived solely from Island 
data, while the explanatory variables are computed using all Nasdaq trading activity and 
Nasdaq-wide prices. Since Island accounts for a relatively small portion of overall 
Nasdaq activity, problems stemming from reverse causality or correlated measurement 
errors are likely to be small. We provide additional evidence on this point in Section 8.  
6. Results 
Table 6 reports estimations in which the Island variables are modeled as functions 
of the control variables and a total volatility measure. As discussed in the preceding 
                                                 
15 There are two important generic limitations of standard duration analysis in limit order 
applications. First, we view the observations (orders) as independent, whereas the 
dynamic trading strategy models suggest that they may be linked. More importantly, 
though, the framework assumes that the cancellation and execution processes are 
independent (conditional on the explanatory variables). This independence is violated by 
a strategy in which we cancel limit orders if the price has moved out of range. 
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section, σr is a conventional daily volatility measure, while  measures the implicit 
random-walk volatility. Despite this difference, the estimated effects of both variables are 
similar in all specifications. Most importantly, higher volatility is associated with a lower 
overall limit order submission proportion, but with a higher rate of execution. These 
findings are most consistent with the (non-equilibrium) order strategy models. In these 
models higher volatility increases the option value (a cost) of the limit order (or 
alternatively the pick-off risk). This reduces the desirability of limit orders. The shift to 
market orders increases the execution proportion of the remaining limit orders (as 
predicted by Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang (1997)). 
wσ
16 
The equilibrium view holds that limit order traders protect themselves against the 
higher pick-off risk by pricing their orders less aggressively. The estimates for the limit 
order submission rates differentiated by price support are consistent with this hypothesis. 
Higher volatility is associated with a higher proportion of limit orders priced behind 
Island’s quote. In the equilibrium view, however, this increases the cost of market orders, 
leading to fewer market orders and lower execution rates for limit orders. The results are 
not consistent with these predictions.  
The next set of estimates in Table 6 deals with book depth. (For the sake of 
brevity, only ask-side estimates are presented. Bid-side results are similar. ) Both 
measures of volatility are negatively associated with book depth, but the relation is not 
statistically significant. The associations between time to execution and the volatility 
measures are strongly negative: increased volatility is associated with more rapid 
execution. This is consistent with the analysis and results of Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang 
(1997). It should also be acknowledged, however, that positive relation might arise as a 
                                                 
16 Angel (1994) predicts that the execution probability of limit orders will be increasing 
in the rate of order flow arrival. We tested his prediction using the total number of limit 
and market orders as a proxy for the rate of arrival of orders. Since this measure is highly 
correlated with capitalization and turnover, , we used as controls only average price and 
. The results were supportive of Angel's prediction: all measures of execution 




methodological artifact. A volatile price path is more likely to move away from the limit 
price, increasing the likelihood that the order will be canceled. As noted in the previous 
section, this censoring is not, as the model specification would require, independent of 
the conditional execution probability.  
 In all specifications, the two volatility measures have similar properties. This 
feature is significant. In Handa and Schwartz (1996), limit order traders benefit from 
transient liquidity pressures. The  measure impounds the transient price components, 
while the  measure in principle does not. That these two measures play similar roles 
suggests that volatility effects do not arise solely from transient effects.  
rσ
wσ
To further explore volatility effects, we next consider specifications in which 
systematic and unsystematic risk are differentiated. The estimates, reported in Table 7, do 
not suggest that the distinction is an important one. In most specifications, the signs of 
the coefficients of these variables are identical to those reported for the total volatility 
measures. The effects are, however, statistically weaker.  
The final set of volatility proxy measures volatility that is trade-related, i.e., 
volatility in the sense of pick-off risk.   Table 8 presents these estimates. The absolute 
level of trade-related volatility, , appears to behave in these specifications in much 
the same manner as  or .  
,w xσ
rσ wσ
In summary, the pattern of volatility associations is generally uniform across a 
wide range of volatility measures and proxies. Higher volatility is associated with a 
diminished use of limit orders in general and of limit orders priced at the quote or better, 
but with higher use of limit orders behind the quote. It is furthermore associated with 
increased likelihood of execution, shorter time to execution, and diminished book depth.  
Table 9 reports estimates of specifications that include as a regressor either the 
percentage of institutional holdings (as a proxy for institutional trading) or the average 
number of odd lot trades (a proxy for retail trading). The coefficient of institutional 
holdings is positive for the submission proportions of all limit orders and also that of 
limit orders priced at the quote or better, but negative for the proportion priced behind the 
quote. The odd-lot coefficients are generally of the opposite sign, though of lower 
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significance. These estimates suggest that while institutions are relatively heavy users of 
limit orders, they are less likely to provide depth away from the market.  
7. Hidden and fleeting orders  
Limit orders are sometimes viewed as supplying liquidity in a manner similar to 
(and competing with) dealer quotes. This analogy presumes that limit orders are 
relatively visible and persistent, like the bids and offers of a dealer who is maintaining a 
market presence. In fact, however, many limit orders are either hidden or short-lived. 
This section discusses such orders.  
a. Hidden orders 
The Island trading protocol allows traders to designate that an order not be 
displayed. The no-display option is a common feature of electronic book systems. In 
Island (and most of these systems), the hidden quantities lose priority to visible quantities 
at the same price. From a market design viewpoint, they are thought to encourage traders 
to supply liquidity when they might be reluctant to disclose the full size of the amount 
sought.  
Our data report executions of hidden orders, but not submissions or cancellations. 
Our estimates can only suggest, therefore, a lower limit to the usage of these orders. 
These are reported in . Executed hidden orders constitute only about 3% of 
submitted limit orders (defined as submissions of visible limit orders and executed hidden 
orders), and about 2% by share amounts. They account, however, for almost 12% of all 
order executions and executed shares. This suggests a more significant presence.  
Table 10
b. Fleeting orders 
We have noted that a large number of orders submitted to Island are canceled 
almost immediately. We term limit orders canceled within two seconds of their 
submission “fleeting”. Table 10 reports summary statistics. On average in the full sample, 
fleeting orders constitute 27.7% of all visible orders and 32.5% relative to shares in all 
visible orders. In the subgroup means, relative usage declines modestly with 
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capitalization, average trades and . Table 11 presents summary statistics on the pricing 
of these orders. Fleeting orders are primarily submitted at prices that better the pre-
existing bid or ask.  
rσ
There are several possible explanations for the use of fleeting limit orders. One 
possibility is that the submitter wants to fish for hidden orders that better the opposing 
quote. A buyer, for example, might submit an order priced just short of the ask quote, 
hoping to trade against any hidden sell orders. In this view, a fleeting limit order 
represents a liquidity demander, rather than a supplier. 17 
The question then arises as to why the buyer’s order in the above example needs 
to be visible, even briefly. A hidden order would accomplish the same thing without 
revealing the buyer’s interest. Our data cannot characterize the extent of such practices. 
The fact that many of the fleeting orders are visible, though, suggests that finding hidden 
sellers is not the only motive, and that the brief display serves some purpose. The display 
might signal tentative buying interest to prospective sellers, without going so far as to 
provide them with a firm option.  
A final possibility is a manipulative tactic known as “spoofing”. To manipulate, a 
trader places a visible order in the opposite direction of the trade that is genuinely 
desired. For example, a seller might post a small buy order priced above the current bid, 
in hopes of convincing other buyers to match or outbid. If this occurs, the trader can sell 
into this (higher) price. It is necessary here that the order be visible. The practice 
resembles “shilling” by an auction seller, but there are some significant differences. In 
the stock market, the manipulator runs the risk that the spurious bid will be hit by some 
other seller, increasing the manipulator’s long position. On the other hand, the Nasdaq 
market includes one group of buyers who are compelled to match the manipulator’s 
spurious bid: dealers whose order preferencing arrangements require them to fill at the 
                                                 
17 In light of the ambiguity in classifying fleeting limit orders into liquidity demanding or 
supplying, we repeated the analysis of submission and execution proportions without 
fleeting limit orders. The results were qualitatively similar to those presented and 
discussed in Section 5. 
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best prevailing price. This might make the manipulative strategy an appealing one. Both 
the NASD and SEC are conducting investigations and maintaining surveillance, however, 
(see Connor (2000)). The possibility of detection and prosecution is significant, and for 
this reason we doubt that such tactics lie behind the bulk of the fleeting orders.  
8. Island’s market presence 
Island is only one venue in a broader market that comprises other ECN’s and 
traditional dealers. In this section we examine the relative extent of Island activity, and 
firm and market characteristics to which it is related.  
Table 12 presents summary statistics on Island market share. The average share is 
roughly 6.2% by trades and 3.5% by volume. In the ranked subgroups, this share 
increases with capitalization, the number of average trades, and . Figure 5 presents a 
log/log plot of the average number of Island trades vs. the total number of Nasdaq trades. 
The slope of the log/log best fit line is 1. 7, which suggests that within the sample Island 
trades rise as the 1. 7
rσ
th power of Nasdaq trades. Island’s share increases for more active 
stocks.  
An alternative measure of Island’s impact is the extent to which Island sets or 
matches the market price (the NBBO). We determined that on average Island matched the 
best bid roughly 20% of the time and the best offer roughly 19% of the time. Much less 
frequently, however, was Island alone at the bid or the ask (4% of the time). Only 0.2% 
of the time was Island alone at both the bid and ask. The market share and quoting figures 
suggest that Island does not dominate trading in these stocks. This supports our empirical 
presumption that market variables used as explanatory variables are exogenous to our 
analysis.  
The estimates in Table 12 suggest that Island’s market share is larger for more 
volatile stocks. In cross-sectional regression analyses, this was confirmed in the presence 
of the control variables (capitalization, price and turnover) for all of our volatility 
proxies.  
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The positive relation between market share and volatility may reflect several 
mechanisms. The growth in ECN trading volume has been attributed in the popular press 
to increased day trading. While we have no direct evidence on this, our market share 
estimates are positively correlated with odd-lot trading volume (a measure of retail 
activity) and negatively correlated to institutional ownership. There is also evidence that 
day traders prefer volatile stocks. (Several popular how-to guides cite high volatility as a 
requirement for a stock to be an attractive candidate for day-trading. )  This is consistent 
with our evidence.  
9. Conclusions 
The Island ECN is an electronic limit order book that trades Nasdaq National 
Market stocks, and offers traders an alternative to Nasdaq’s traditional dealer-mediated 
trading. We provide in this paper a cross-sectional analysis of the relationships between 
measures of Island features and various firm characteristics. The relationships involving 
volatility are the most important because they illuminate causal mechanisms that are 
particularly complex.  
Economic models of individual behavior identify several effects of volatility on 
order choice. For a given limit order, higher volatility is usually assumed to lead to higher 
probability of execution and shorter expected time to fill. Lo, MacKinlay, and Zhang 
(1997) find this to be the case for NYSE limit orders. We confirm this finding for Island 
orders. On the other hand, higher volatility may increase the cost of being picked-off or 
chasing a price that has moved away from the limit order. To quantify pick-off risk as 
distinct from total volatility, we employ as one of our measures the return variance that 
can be attributed to trades. Handa and Schwartz (1996) point out that transitory volatility 
is a source of profit for limit orders. We therefore examine both total transaction price 
volatility (which includes mechanism-related volatility, e.g., that arising from bid-ask 
bounce) and the volatility of the implicit random-walk component of the stock price 
(which excludes mechanism-related volatility). We furthermore separately examine the 
effects of systematic and unsystematic risk.  
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For all measures, we find that higher volatility is associated with a lower 
proportion of limit orders in Island’s incoming flow. This suggests that for the 
representative trader, expected costs of pick-off risk or chasing the stock outweigh the 
benefit of increased execution likelihood or expected profits from transitory volatility. 
We also find for all measures that higher volatility is associated with more limit orders 
being entered at prices away from the market, i.e., priced less aggressively.  
Equilibrium economic analysis introduces additional considerations. In Foucault 
(1999), an increase in the pick-off risk component of volatility causes limit order traders 
to price their orders less aggressively. This is consistent with our findings on limit order 
pricing noted above. Foucault’s analysis furthermore suggests an equilibrium effect. 
When limit orders are priced less aggressively, the spread widens and book depths drop, 
making market orders more costly. This engenders a shift in the order mix toward limit 
orders and a lower probability of execution. Our findings are not consistent with a major 
role for this mechanism.  
Island offers limit order submitters a “no display” option, wherein an order is 
entered on the book, but is not visible to any other market participants. Submissions of 
such hidden orders are not reflected in our data set. Executions of hidden orders are 
noted, however, and these suggest substantial usage of these orders. Executions of hidden 
orders constitute roughly ten percent of all executions. Furthermore, many limit orders 
are cancelled almost immediately after they are submitted. We term orders canceled in 
two seconds or less as “fleeting”. Fleeting orders constitute 27.7% of all limit order 
submissions. Possible motives for these orders include probing for hidden orders, 
communicating tentative trading interest, and manipulative “spoofing”.  
Island’s market share varies considerably across firms, and is positively related to 
overall Nasdaq activity in the stock. Thus, while Nasdaq activity is concentrated in firms 
that are larger (by market value), the concentration of Island’s trading is even more 
pronounced.  
These results suggest several directions for subsequent research. First, the 
concentration of Island’s activity in larger firms raises concerns about the viability of the 
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electronic limit order book as the primary mechanism for low-capitalization or low-
activity firms. The importance of this issue for public policy warrants further 
examination.  
Glosten (1994) suggests that there are powerful forces favoring the consolidation 
of trading activity in one electronic limit order book. In this connection, it is worth 
emphasizing that Island is but one of two highly successful ECNs. The market share of 
Instinet (the other) is larger than Island’s on the basis of trading volume, but smaller on 
the basis of number of trades. The joint success of both ECN’s indicates the likely 
importance of trading clientele attributes as determinants of ECN viability.  
In many economic models limit orders are characterized as being widely visible 
and persistent, much like dealer quotes. Furthermore, regulatory initiatives such as the 
SEC’s Order Handling Rules focus on protecting the rights of limit order traders against 
dealers. From this perspective, limit orders compete with, and are therefore in some sense 
equivalent to, dealer quotes as sources of liquidity. Many of the Island limit orders, 
however, are hidden, and a large fraction are canceled almost immediately after 
submission. These orders are quite different, therefore, from dealer quotes. Economic 
analysis of such orders and the strategies that rely on them constitute another worthwhile 
research direction.  
The analysis in this paper is cross-sectional, and attempts to relate firm-specific 
characteristics to average attributes of Island activity. There is also, however, substantial 
dynamic variation in activity. The depth (available liquidity) on Island’s book, for 
example, is highly variable over time. We are in the process of exploring the nature of 






Ahn, H.-J., Bae, K.-H., Chan, K., 2001. Limit orders, depth and volatility: Evidence from 
then Stock Exchange of Hong Kong. Journal of Finance 56, 767-788. 
Angel, J. J., 1994. Limit versus market orders.  Unpublished working paper. School of 
Business Administration, Georgetown University. 
Barclay, M. J., Hendershott, T., McCormick, D. T., 2001. Electronic communications 
networks and market quality.  Unpublished working paper.  University of 
Rochester. 
Biais, B., Hillion, P., Spatt, C., 1995. An empirical analysis of the limit order book and 
the order flow in the Paris Bourse. Journal of Finance 50, 1655-1689. 
Chakravarty, S., Holden, C. W., 1995. An integrated model of market and limit orders. 
Journal of Financial Intermediation 4, 213-241. 
Chan, K. C., Christie, W. G., Schultz, P. H., 1995. Market structure and the intraday 
pattern of bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ securities. Journal of Business 68, 35-60. 
Cho, J.-W., Nelling, E., 2000. The probability of limit order execution. Financial 
Analysts Journal 56, 28-33. 
Chung, K. H., Van Ness, B. F., Van Ness, R. A., 1999. Limit orders and the bid-ask 
spread. Journal of Financial Economics 53, 255-287. 
Clark, P. K., 1973. A subordinated stochastic process model with finite variance for 
speculative prices. Econometrica 41. 
Cohen, K. J., Maier, S. F., Schwartz, R. A., Whitcomb, D. K., 1981. Transaction costs, 
order placement strategy, and existence of the bid-ask spread. Journal of Political 
Economy 89, 287-305. 
Connor, John. 28 February 2000. No joke: NASD plans crackdown on "spoofing," 
placing and canceling a quote to spark a move.  Wall Street Journal. 
Conrad, J., Johnson, K. M., Wahal, S., 2001. Alternative trading systems.  Unpublished 
Page 33 
working paper. University of North Carolina, Kenan-Flagler Business School. 
Copeland, T., Galai, D., 1983. Information effects and the bid-ask spread. Journal of 
Finance 38, 1457-1469. 
Coppejans, M. D. I. M. A., 2001. Liquidity in an automated auction.  Unpublished 
working paper. Department of Economics, Duke University. 
Domowitz, I., Wang, J., 1994. Auctions as algorithms. Journal of Economic Dynamics 
and Control 18, 29-60. 
Easley, D., O'Hara, M., 1987. Price, trade size, and information in securities markets. 
Journal of Financial Economics 19, 69-90. 
Foucault, T., 1999. Order flow composition and trading costs in a dynamic limit order 
market. Journal of Financial Markets 2, 99-134. 
Foucault, T., Kadan, O., Kandel, E., 2001. Limit order book as a market for liquidity.  
Unpublished working paper.  HEC School of Management. 
Glosten, L. R., 1994. Is the electronic open limit order book inevitable? Journal of 
Finance 49, 1127-61. 
Glosten, L. R., Milgrom, P. R., 1985. Bid, ask, and transaction prices in a specialist 
market with heterogeneously informed traders. Journal of Financial Economics 
14, 71-100. 
Goldstein, M. A., Kavajecz, K. A., 2000. Liquidity provision during circuit breakers and 
extreme market movements.  Unpublished working paper. Department of Finance, 
Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania. 
Griffiths, M. D., Smith, B. F., Turnbull, D. A. S., White, R. W., 2000. The costs and 
determinants of order aggressiveness. Journal of Financial Economics 56, 65-88. 
Handa, P., Schwartz, R. A., 1996. Limit order trading. Journal of Finance 51, 1835-1861. 
Harris, L., 1998. Optimal dynamic order submission strategies in some stylized trading 
problems. Financial Markets, Institutions and Instruments 7. 
Harris, L. E., Hasbrouck, J., 1996. Market vs. limit orders:  the SuperDOT evidence on 
order submission strategy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 213-
31. 
Page 34 
Harris, L. E., Panchapagesan, V., 1999. The information content of the limit order book: 
Evidence from NYSE specialist actions.  Unpublished working paper. Marshall 
School of Business, University of Southern California. 
Hasbrouck, J., 1991. The summary informativeness of stock trades: An econometric 
analysis. Review of Financial Studies 4, 571-95. 
Huang, R., 2000. Price discovery by ECNs and Nasdaq market makers.  Unpublished 
working paper. Owen School of Management, Vanderbilt University. 
Island. 2001. "Island's Market Leadership." Web page, [accessed 20 August 2001]. 
Available at http://www.island.com/pressroom/leadership.htm. 
Lo, A. W., MacKinlay, A. C., Zhang, J., 1997. Econometric models of limit order 
execution.  Unpublished working paper. NBER. 
Parlour, C., 1998. Price dynamics in limit order markets. Review of Financial Studies 11, 
789-816. 
Parlour, C. A., Seppi, D. J., 2001. Liquidity-based competition for order flow.  
Unpublished working paper.  Graduate School of Industrial Administration, 
Carnegie Mellon University. 
Rock, K., 1990. The specialist's order book and price anomalies.  Unpublished working 
paper. Graduate School of Business, Harvard University. 
Rousseeuw, P. J., Leroy, A. M., 1987. Robust Regression and Outlier Detection. John 
Wiley & Sons, New York. 
Russell, J. R., Engle, R. F., 1998. Econometric analysis of discrete-valued irregularly-
spaced financial transactions data using a new Autoregressive Conditional 
Multinomial model.  Unpublished working paper. University of Chicago, 
Graduate School of Business. 
Sandas, P., 1999. Adverse selection and competitive market making: evidence from a 
pure limit order book.  Unpublished working paper. Wharton School, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
Seppi, D. J., 1997. Liquidity provision with limit orders and a strategic specialist. Review 
of Financial Studies 10, 103-150. 
Page 35 
Simaan, Y., Weaver, D. G., Whitcomb, D. K., 1998. The quotation behavior of ECN's 
and Nasdaq market makers.  Unpublished working paper. Zicklin School of 
Business, Baruch College. 
Smith, J. W., 2000. Market vs. limit order submission behavior at a Nasdaq market 
maker.  Unpublished working paper.  NASD Economic Research. 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. 1996. Order execution obligations. 
Release No. 34-37619A . 
US Securities and Exchange Commission. 1998. Regulation of exchanges and alterative 
trading systems. 
Release No. 34-40760. 
 
Page 36 
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Summary statistics (across firms) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks 
(ranked by equity capitalization on September 30, 1999). Capitalization, market price, and trading volume are taken from CRSP;  σ  is the standard 
deviation of daily CRSP returns; spreads are derived from Nastraq;  institutional holdings are from the Value Line Investment survey; odd-lot trades 



























Mean 10,205 2,677 0.0436 1,873 1.288 63.03 50.8% 0.2563 0.46% 346
Median 3,081 1,066 0.0433 877 1.107 49.82 51.3% 0.1871 0.44% 125
SD 38,104 4,413 0.0169 3,504 0.946 45.66 25.6% 0.2180 0.25% 786
Min 824 16 0.0018 7 0.028 8.40 6.0% 0.0520 0.07% 5
Max 494,932 28,654 0.1083 30,073 5.208 326.58 97.9% 1.9103 2.79% 8,348
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 300 290 300 300 300
Low 1,500 654 0.0386 549 0.952 39.16 50.8% 0.2520 0.63% 75
Medium 3,169 1,474 0.0470 1,051 1.322 58.26 50.7% 0.2757 0.49% 147
High 25,947 5,904 0.0452 4,017 1.590 91.67 50.7% 0.2413 0.28% 817
Low 1,953 326 0.0326 314 0.541 41.84 48.4% 0.2730 0.63% 49
Medium 3,772 1,202 0.0491 933 1.257 62.19 57.1% 0.2849 0.48% 134
High 24,891 6,504 0.0491 4,371 2.066 85.06 47.1% 0.2109 0.28% 855
Low 18,100 2,290 0.0257 2,038 0.565 44.20 51.9% 0.1989 0.49% 317
Medium 7,304 2,548 0.0429 1,872 1.424 63.11 57.3% 0.2162 0.41% 271










σ r  groups
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Table 2. Island summary statistics 
Summary statistics (across firms) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks 
(ranked by equity capitalization on September 30, 1999). All data are tabulated from Island ITCH data. On the Island system, all orders carry a limit 
price. Market orders are defined as orders that are matched upon arrival (and so never appear in the book).  
Avg daily 
no of limit 
orders
Avg size of 
limit order 
(shares)
Avg no of 
cancelations
Avg size of 
cancelation 
(shares)
Avg no of 
filled limit 
orders
Avg size of 
limit order 
fill (shares)









Mean 965.9 572.4 672.0 617.7 275.7 389.7 339.9 335.0 57.7
Median 285.3 585.2 221.0 627.3 51.1 380.1 60.7 329.3 7.6
SD 1,764.8 158.1 1,144.6 157.5 602.5 133.9 760.7 110.2 153.2
Min 3.9 214.1 2.7 241.9 0.0 148.8 0.0 123.3 0.0
Max 11,992.4 985.3 6,963.5 1,032.0 4,726.7 931.8 6,123.6 742.7 1,498.7
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 299 300 299 300
Low 157.7 612.5 119.3 644.6 34.0 414.9 40.5 363.5 6.4
Medium 461.3 567.5 337.7 613.9 113.7 379.9 136.8 329.2 19.5
High 2,278.6 537.2 1,558.9 594.6 679.3 374.5 842.4 312.5 147.3
Low 67.1 631.5 58.4 653.1 7.7 423.1 8.6 377.5 1.0
Medium 332.5 553.3 257.2 599.5 69.5 372.2 80.7 322.1 12.2
High 2,498.0 532.5 1,700.3 600.4 749.8 374.1 930.4 305.8 159.9
Low 680.0 668.1 488.9 694.0 177.9 463.2 229.8 404.5 30.5
Medium 913.6 592.6 659.9 644.1 239.1 403.6 289.6 344.7 44.2










σ r  groups
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Table 3. Submission and execution proportions for Island limit orders.  
Summary statistics (across firms) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999 for visible (non-hidden) Island limit orders. The firm sample 
is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on September 30, 1999). All data are tabulated from Island ITCH 

















Mean 84.3% 53.8% 30.5% 90.3% 58.5% 31.8% 16.0% 15.4% 17.8% 11.1% 10.3% 13.1%
Median 83.4% 49.2% 34.0% 90.1% 55.7% 33.8% 17.2% 15.2% 19.4% 11.0% 9.7% 13.7%
SD 7.8% 25.0% 17.6% 5.1% 23.9% 19.3% 8.2% 8.6% 7.7% 6.3% 6.3% 6.4%
Min 66.3% 13.4% 0.0% 76.3% 15.6% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Max 100.0% 100.0% 59.1% 100.0% 100.0% 66.7% 34.7% 38.9% 33.5% 31.0% 33.7% 31.8%
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 298 300 300 298
Low 88.9% 69.4% 19.4% 93.1% 73.7% 19.4% 11.3% 10.5% 13.8% 7.7% 6.9% 10.3%
Medium 84.0% 53.8% 30.2% 90.1% 58.9% 31.2% 16.4% 15.6% 18.6% 11.3% 10.2% 13.7%
High 80.1% 38.3% 41.9% 87.7% 42.9% 44.7% 20.3% 20.3% 21.0% 14.3% 13.7% 15.3%
Low 92.3% 80.9% 11.4% 95.3% 84.3% 11.1% 7.6% 7.0% 10.6% 5.0% 4.5% 8.0%
Medium 83.6% 51.6% 32.0% 89.8% 57.4% 32.4% 16.9% 15.6% 18.9% 11.5% 10.1% 13.8%
High 77.1% 29.0% 48.2% 85.7% 33.9% 51.9% 23.5% 23.7% 23.8% 16.8% 16.1% 17.5%
Low 90.8% 75.6% 15.2% 94.2% 78.4% 15.8% 9.1% 9.1% 11.1% 6.5% 6.4% 8.6%
Medium 83.0% 48.4% 34.5% 89.4% 53.6% 35.8% 17.4% 16.3% 19.4% 12.0% 10.8% 14.2%
High 79.2% 37.4% 41.8% 87.2% 43.5% 43.8% 21.5% 20.9% 22.7% 14.9% 13.6% 16.5%
Limit order executions 
(shares)
Price relative to 
quote
Price relative to 
quote
Price relative to 
quote







σ r  groups
Limit order submissions 
relative to all orders:       
Limit order submissions 
(shares) relative to shares 








Table 4. Volatility summary statistics 
Summary statistics (across firms). The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on September 30, 
1999). σ  is the standard deviation of the daily CRSP return. σ  is the standard deviation of the random-walk component of the stock price; σ  is 
the standard deviation of the contribution to the random-walk component attributable to signed trades.  and  are estimated using the 
Hasbrouck (1991) procedure applied to a vector autoregression of quote-midpoint returns and signed trades, aggregated over one-minute intervals. 
They are scaled to reflect volatility over a 6. 5 hour trading day. σ , σ , and σ  are estimated over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 
1999.  is the standard deviation of systematic risk; ( )  is the standard deviation of unsystematic risk. Both are based on the market model 





r w ,w x
iteσ
it itr α β= + +i i Mtr Mt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, estimated using daily CRSP data from October 1, 1996 to 
September 30, 1999.  
 
σr σw σw,x β i σ M σ (e it )
Mean 0.0436 0.0383 0.0193 0.0133 0.0330
Median 0.0433 0.0383 0.0197 0.0132 0.0331
SD 0.0169 0.0138 0.0076 0.0050 0.0108
Min 0.0018 0.0029 0.0015 0.0025 0.0136
Max 0.1083 0.0890 0.0438 0.0310 0.0620
Nobs 300 300 300 211 211
Low 0.0386 0.0346 0.0167 0.0106 0.0314
Medium 0.0470 0.0412 0.0211 0.0130 0.0348
High 0.0452 0.0392 0.0202 0.0168 0.0332
Low 0.0326 0.0298 0.0142 0.0095 0.0277
Medium 0.0491 0.0428 0.0221 0.0136 0.0352
High 0.0491 0.0424 0.0217 0.0185 0.0380
Low 0.0257 0.0244 0.0123 0.0106 0.0251
Medium 0.0429 0.0387 0.0199 0.0153 0.0374














Table 5. Depth summary statistics 
Summary statistics (across firms) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999 for visible (non-hidden) Island limit orders. The firm sample 
is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on September 30, 1999). All data are tabulated from Island ITCH 
data. The order sample is all visible (non-hidden) limit orders entered into the Island system that are not matched upon arrival. For firm i and five-
minute interval t, we compute askD , the total dollar value of all limit orders on the ask side of the book at the end of t. We then compute for each firm 



























Mean 237.3 210.1 145.5 1.4 142.3 118.2 99.4 1.7
Median 66.1 42.3 66.1 1.0 38.6 22.1 48.2 1.2
SD 565.8 553.4 255.8 1.4 321.2 299.2 161.3 1.6
Min 0.1 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.1 0.0 1.4 0.3
Max 5,392.8 5,465.8 2,130.1 17.1 2,698.7 2,535.4 1,486.9 13.3
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 300 300 300
Low 48.8 37.9 40.2 1.9 29.9 21.2 29.7 2.4
Medium 117.8 98.0 86.3 1.5 69.6 52.5 61.6 1.6
High 545.2 494.3 309.9 1.0 327.3 280.8 206.8 1.1
Low 15.8 8.3 22.2 2.4 10.3 3.9 17.5 2.9
Medium 69.4 48.3 71.8 1.2 46.4 27.7 56.6 1.4
High 626.6 573.7 342.3 0.7 370.1 322.9 224.0 0.8
Low 250.4 233.5 127.7 2.2 142.4 124.6 81.0 2.7
Medium 193.8 169.2 134.7 1.0 118.0 95.4 94.1 1.2














Table 6. Island limit orders and summary volatility 
Regression coefficient estimates (using the indicated specification) for submission proportions, execution probabilities, dollar value of limit orders on 
the ask side of the book, and limit order durations. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on 
September 30, 1999) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. “Regression” and “logit regression” specifications are estimated across 
firms in the sample. The duration specifications are estimated for a sample consisting of 2,000 randomly selected limit orders for each firm, adjusted 
to weight all firms equally. Numbers in parentheses are coefficient estimates divided by the asymptotic standard error of estimate. The latter standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent in the regression and logit regression specifications (but not in the duration specifications). σ  is the standard 
deviation of the daily CRSP return. σ  is the standard deviation of the implicit random-walk component of the quote midpoint, estimated with one-








turnover) No. Obs. R2 Scale Shape
Logit Limit subm. prop. 10.158 -20.970 -0.347 0.004 -0.486 298 0.753
regression      (all prices) (20.44) (-7.56) (-17.81) (7.42) (-7.58)
Limit subm. prop. 15.901 -34.561 -0.657 0.006 -0.774 299 0.821
     (quote or better) (21.55) (-8.10) (-22.44) (6.96) (-8.18)
Limit subm. prop. -15.205 34.834 0.584 -0.005 0.765 298 0.744
     (away) (-16.24) (7.72) (15.78) (-5.78) (7.89)
Limit exec. prop. -10.393 22.396 0.356 -0.004 0.506 298 0.754
     (all prices) (-19.65) (7.74) (17.09) (-7.35) (7.87)
Limit exec. prop. -11.401 22.098 0.400 -0.004 0.502 298 0.762
     (quote or better) (-21.24) (7.91) (18.60) (-7.24) (8.17)
Limit exec. prop. -6.568 14.652 0.204 -0.003 0.325 283 0.570
     (away) (-14.23) (6.72) (10.82) (-6.11) (5.93)
Regression Ask Depth -8,401.492 -992.833 402.860 -3.075 84.681 300 0.479
(-5.18) (-1.00) (5.25) (-3.63) (3.10)
Duration Time to execution 14.832 -23.159 -0.414 0.003 -0.466 3.049 -1.893
(110.06) (-63.91) (-71.68) (19.92) (-67.28) (365.68) (-140.72)
Logit Limit subm. prop. 10.436 -25.472 -0.357 0.004 -0.495 298 0.753
regression      (all prices) (20.56) (-7.43) (-18.53) (7.74) (-7.86)
Limit subm. prop. 16.482 -43.326 -0.677 0.006 -0.777 299 0.828
     (quote or better) (22.07) (-8.31) (-23.41) (7.18) (-8.54)
Limit subm. prop. -15.994 45.651 0.610 -0.005 0.753 298 0.762
     (away) (-16.56) (8.13) (16.27) (-6.17) (8.32)
Limit exec. prop. -10.693 27.242 0.366 -0.004 0.515 298 0.755
     (all prices) (-19.84) (7.61) (17.84) (-7.77) (8.17)
Limit exec. prop. -11.703 26.936 0.410 -0.004 0.510 298 0.763
     (quote or better) (-21.50) (7.82) (19.40) (-7.55) (8.48)
Limit exec. prop. -6.592 16.182 0.206 -0.003 0.341 283 0.547
(away) (-13.87) (5.88) (10.84) (-6.01) (6.10)
Regression Ask Depth -8,372.235 -1,359.334 401.898 -3.062 85.195 300 0.479
(-5.16) (-1.15) (5.23) (-3.60) (3.15)
Duration Time to execution 15.017 -27.181 -0.422 0.003 -0.484 3.052 -1.902
(109.54) (-61.20) (-72.30) (20.43) (-70.01) (364.36) (-139.85) 
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Table 7. Island limit orders and systematic/unsystematic volatility 
Regression coefficient estimates (using the indicated specification) for submission proportions, execution probabilities, dollar value of limit orders on 
the ask side of the book, and limit order durations. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on 
September 30, 1999) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. “Regression” and “logit regression” specifications are estimated across 
firms in the sample. The duration specifications are estimated for a sample consisting of 2,000 randomly selected limit orders for each firm, adjusted 
to weight all firms equally. Numbers in parentheses are coefficient estimates divided by the asymptotic standard error of estimate. The latter standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent in the regression and logit regression specifications (but not in the duration specifications) β σ
( )
  is the 
standard deviation of systematic risk;  is the standard deviation of unsystematic risk. Both are based on the market model , 
where r
i M
iteσ it i i Mt itr r eα β= + +
Mt is the return on the CRSP value-weighted portfolio, estimated using daily CRSP data from October 1, 1996 to September 30, 1999.  
Model 






Obs. R2 Scale Shape
Logit Limit subm. prop. 8.272 -23.336 -0.281 0.003 -0.638 209 0.702
regression      (all prices) (14.82) (-1.82) (-8.53) (2.86) (-5.25)
Limit subm. prop. 12.270 -50.171 -0.518 0.005 -0.944 210 0.758
     (quote or better) (14.71) (-2.46) (-10.71) (2.89) (-5.40)
Limit subm. prop. -11.470 53.201 0.442 -0.005 0.974 209 0.667
     (away) (-11.95) (2.24) (8.33) (-2.59) (5.17)
Limit exec. prop. -8.379 23.754 0.285 -0.003 0.666 209 0.700
     (all prices) (-14.29) (1.80) (8.32) (-2.71) (5.36)
Limit exec. prop. -9.488 22.484 0.334 -0.003 0.649 209 0.718
     (quote or better) (-16.50) (1.81) (10.06) (-2.83) (5.49)
Limit exec. prop. -5.118 13.655 0.152 -0.002 0.414 194 0.467
     (away) (-9.21) (1.30) (4.95) (-1.59) (3.62)
Regression Ask Depth -8,649.081 4,357.588 407.329 -2.735 13.569 211 0.493
(-4.43) (0.46) (4.34) (-2.10) (0.43)
Duration Time to execution 13.288 -33.995 -0.336 0.000 -0.595 3.266 -1.532
(88.37) (-16.09) (-45.98) (0.54) (-57.55) (313.29) (-153.07)
Logit Limit subm. prop. 10.872 -25.268 -0.376 0.004 -0.513 209 0.738
regression      (all prices) (14.26) (-3.00) (-15.62) (4.47) (-3.91)
Limit subm. prop. 16.954 -43.757 -0.697 0.006 -0.757 210 0.794
     (quote or better) (13.89) (-3.44) (-17.47) (4.38) (-4.00)
Limit subm. prop. -16.341 45.256 0.629 -0.006 0.787 209 0.702
     (away) (-10.43) (3.24) (11.67) (-4.00) (3.87)
Limit exec. prop. -11.152 27.205 0.386 -0.004 0.526 209 0.739
     (all prices) (-14.09) (3.17) (15.25) (-4.46) (3.99)
Limit exec. prop. -12.127 25.917 0.429 -0.004 0.516 209 0.754
     (quote or better) (-15.83) (3.19) (17.18) (-4.33) (4.13)
Limit exec. prop. -6.978 18.400 0.217 -0.002 0.302 194 0.512
(away) (-9.95) (2.64) (9.12) (-2.79) (2.56)
Regression Ask Depth -9,159.383 5,031.732 425.725 -2.891 -12.648 211 0.497
(-4.77) (1.96) (4.70) (-2.22) (-0.46)
Duration Time to execution 16.945 -35.203 -0.475 0.002 -0.462 3.235 -1.582
(101.86) (-40.18) (-67.71) (8.45) (-46.07) (311.97) (-146.15)  
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Table 8. Island limit orders and trade-related volatility 
Regression coefficient estimates (using the indicated specification) for submission proportions, execution probabilities, dollar value of limit orders on 
the ask side of the book, and limit order durations. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on 
September 30, 1999) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. “Regression” and “logit regression” specifications are estimated across 
firms in the sample. The duration specifications are estimated for a sample consisting of 2,000 randomly selected limit orders for each firm, adjusted 
to weight all firms equally. Numbers in parentheses are coefficient estimates divided by the asymptotic standard error of estimate. The latter standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent in the regression and logit regression specifications (but not in the duration specifications) σ  is the 
standard deviation of the contribution to the random-walk component attributable to signed trades.  is estimated using the Hasbrouck (1991) 
procedure applied to a vector autoregression of quote-midpoint returns and signed trades, aggregated over one-minute intervals and scaled to reflect 










Obs. R2 Scale Shape
Logit Limit subm. prop. 9.223 -35.526 -0.311 0.003 -0.514 298 0.709
regression      (all prices) (19.93) (-8.20) (-16.41) (3.87) (-8.04)
Limit subm. prop. 14.371 -58.361 -0.599 0.004 -0.822 299 0.777
     (quote or better) (19.96) (-9.29) (-19.75) (3.30) (-8.83)
Limit subm. prop. -13.886 64.464 0.530 -0.003 0.788 298 0.715
     (away) (-15.27) (8.77) (14.44) (-2.90) (8.23)
Limit exec. prop. -9.416 38.485 0.318 -0.003 0.533 298 0.711
     (all prices) (-19.20) (8.32) (15.86) (-3.83) (8.21)
Limit exec. prop. -10.430 37.801 0.362 -0.003 0.529 298 0.720
     (quote or better) (-20.79) (7.96) (17.45) (-3.86) (8.34)
Limit exec. prop. -5.760 22.325 0.174 -0.002 0.345 283 0.506
     (away) (-12.69) (6.45) (9.08) (-2.87) (5.84)
Regression Ask Depth -8,246.638 -6,597.081 399.715 -3.071 103.612 300 0.484
(-5.12) (-3.01) (5.22) (-3.62) (3.76)
Duration Time to execution 13.278 -31.166 -0.356 0.001 -0.461 3.088 -1.872




Table 9. Island limit orders and investor characteristics 
Regression coefficient estimates (using the indicated specification) for submission proportions, execution probabilities, dollar value of limit orders on 
the ask side of the book, and limit order durations. The sample is the largest 300 Nasdaq National Market stocks (ranked by equity capitalization on 
September 30, 1999) over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. “Regression” and “logit regression” specifications are estimated across 
firms in the sample. The duration specifications are estimated for a sample consisting of 2,000 randomly selected limit orders for each firm, adjusted 
to weight all firms equally. Numbers in parentheses are coefficient estimates divided by the asymptotic standard error of estimate. The latter standard 
errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent in the regression and logit regression specifications (but not in the duration specifications) Institutional 
holdings are from the Value Line Investment survey; odd-lot trades were supplied by NASD Economic Research.  
 
Model 
specification Dependent variable Intercept
Institutional 
holdings







Obs. R2 Scale Shape
Logit Limit subm. prop. 7.718 0.006 -0.290 0.003 -0.743 288 0.702
regression      (all prices) (18.86) (7.01) (-15.57) (5.03) (-10.93)
Limit subm. prop. 11.706 0.012 -0.559 0.005 -1.202 289 0.776
     (quote or better) (19.16) (9.35) (-19.93) (4.85) (-12.60)
Limit subm. prop. -11.103 -0.010 0.484 -0.004 1.169 288 0.674
     (away) (-14.03) (-6.01) (13.42) (-3.52) (11.23)
Limit exec. prop. -7.784 -0.007 0.294 -0.003 0.779 288 0.699
     (all prices) (-17.87) (-7.03) (14.80) (-4.90) (11.20)
Limit exec. prop. -8.792 -0.008 0.340 -0.004 0.781 288 0.728
     (quote or better) (-20.57) (-8.39) (17.51) (-5.28) (11.68)
Limit exec. prop. -4.653 -0.005 0.157 -0.002 0.483 273 0.509
     (away) (-11.68) (-6.68) (8.60) (-3.94) (7.83)
Regression Ask Depth -8,338.209 -3.515 407.293 -3.488 104.464 290 0.500
(-5.09) (-4.21) (5.24) (-3.88) (3.55)
Duration Time to execution 11.692 0.003 -0.322 0.001 -0.597 3.072 -1.922
(91.02) (16.38) (-56.45) (4.68) (-83.35) (351.45) (-129.59)
Logit Limit subm. prop. 6.162 -0.189 -0.103 0.005 -0.481 298 0.663
regression      (all prices) (7.30) (-2.37) (-1.31) (5.06) (-4.06)
Limit subm. prop. 8.448 -0.416 -0.160 0.008 -0.668 299 0.752
     (quote or better) (7.03) (-3.66) (-1.43) (5.62) (-4.03)
Limit subm. prop. -7.470 0.445 0.059 -0.008 0.631 298 0.681
     (away) (-6.27) (4.10) (0.56) (-5.48) (4.03)
Limit exec. prop. -6.223 0.191 0.105 -0.005 0.512 298 0.658
     (all prices) (-7.06) (2.29) (1.28) (-4.83) (4.17)
Limit exec. prop. -7.308 0.186 0.154 -0.005 0.509 298 0.670
     (quote or better) (-8.56) (2.30) (1.95) (-4.83) (4.33)
Limit exec. prop. -3.807 0.118 0.042 -0.003 0.324 283 0.464
(away) (-5.39) (1.92) (0.68) (-4.08) (3.32)
Regression Ask Depth -8,090.570 48.104 361.617 -3.777 28.249 300 0.482
(-4.86) (2.41) (4.51) (-4.18) (0.97)
Duration Time to execution 9.227 -0.270 -0.063 0.004 -0.363 3.050 -2.003
(68.12) (-41.24) (-7.93) (25.72) (-43.33) (348.53) (-128.30)  
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Table 10. Hidden and fleeting orders 
Summary statistics for the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 
trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. All data are tabulated from Island ITCH data. Hidden orders are those that were entered with a “no 
display” qualifier. Visible orders are limit orders not so qualified, that are not matched immediately on arrival. Fleeting orders are visible limit orders 
that are canceled (unexecuted) within two seconds of entry.  
 
Executions of 





hidden orders / 


















/ Shares in all 
visible limit 
orders
Mean 3.1% 1.8% 11.8% 11.8% 27.7% 32.5%
Median 2.0% 1.1% 10.1% 10.3% 25.4% 29.8%
SD 3.3% 1.9% 9.3% 9.5% 11.7% 12.0%
Min 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.9% 5.8%
Max 18.2% 11.7% 100.0% 100.0% 88.4% 91.5%
Nobs 300 300 299 299 300 300
Low 1.7% 1.0% 9.2% 9.2% 32.5% 36.7%
Medium 3.0% 1.8% 11.5% 11.6% 27.6% 32.7%
High 4.7% 2.7% 14.6% 14.5% 22.9% 28.1%
Low 0.9% 0.5% 7.7% 7.8% 36.9% 40.5%
Medium 3.1% 1.8% 12.2% 12.3% 25.9% 31.6%
High 5.4% 3.1% 15.3% 15.3% 20.2% 25.4%
Low 0.8% 0.5% 6.6% 6.4% 34.7% 37.5%
Medium 2.8% 1.6% 10.7% 10.9% 26.9% 32.1%















Table 11. Pricing of fleeting orders 
Summary statistics for the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 
trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. All data are tabulated from Island ITCH data. Fleeting orders are visible limit orders that are canceled 
(unexecuted) within two seconds of entry.  
 
Better At Behind Better At Behind
Mean 83.9% 6.7% 9.5% 85.6% 6.6% 7.9%
Median 88.9% 5.1% 5.7% 87.9% 5.8% 5.8%
SD 14.9% 6.1% 9.5% 10.5% 4.7% 7.0%
Min 30.2% 0.0% 0.0% 47.7% 0.0% 0.0%
Max 100.0% 33.3% 48.1% 100.0% 28.2% 40.6%
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 300
Low 92.8% 3.2% 4.0% 91.7% 4.6% 3.8%
Medium 85.8% 6.1% 8.1% 86.4% 6.4% 7.3%
High 73.0% 10.8% 16.2% 78.7% 8.8% 12.6%
Low 96.4% 1.5% 2.2% 94.5% 3.1% 2.3%
Medium 87.2% 5.7% 7.1% 86.7% 6.4% 6.9%
High 68.0% 13.0% 19.1% 75.5% 10.1% 14.4%
Low 90.4% 4.0% 5.6% 91.0% 4.6% 4.4%
Medium 83.3% 7.0% 9.8% 85.7% 6.7% 7.6%





σ r  groups









Table 12. Market share 
Summary statistics for the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 
































Table 13. Island’s pricing 
Summary statistics for the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 
trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. Statistics are based on Island ITCH and Nasdaq Nastraq data.  







Mean 19.6% 18.6% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 0.2%
Median 14.5% 14.4% 1.3% 2.9% 3.0% 0.1%
SD 15.2% 13.9% 6.5% 3.3% 3.2% 0.5%
Min 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Max 73.3% 69.0% 45.8% 21.6% 21.9% 4.3%
Nobs 300 300 300 300 300 300
Low 10.1% 9.6% 1.0% 2.2% 2.5% 0.1%
Medium 17.0% 16.7% 2.7% 3.9% 4.0% 0.2%
High 31.7% 29.3% 8.2% 5.7% 5.3% 0.4%
Low 7.6% 7.3% 0.3% 2.1% 2.5% 0.0%
Medium 14.6% 14.4% 1.5% 3.6% 3.7% 0.1%
High 36.5% 33.9% 10.0% 6.1% 5.6% 0.5%
Low 13.7% 12.6% 2.8% 2.0% 2.1% 0.0%
Medium 21.2% 20.2% 4.0% 3.9% 3.9% 0.2%
High 23.8% 22.8% 5.1% 5.8% 5.7% 0.5%














Figure 1. Number of Trades 
The sample is the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity 
capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. 






Figure 2. Island market and limit orders 
The sample is the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity 
capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. 




Figure 3. Ask Depth for Microsoft 
Cumulative dollar depth on the ask side is recorded for Microsoft at five-minute intervals during 
regular trading hours from October 1, 1999 through December 31, 1999. Depth is measured in 
intervals of width $1/16. The highest group (“$5. 00”) also includes offerings priced above $5. 
00. At each interval, the line in the middle of the box indicates the median; the bottom and top of 
the box indicate 0. 25 and 0. 75 quantiles; and, the ends of the lines indicate 0. 01 and 0. 99 




Figure 4. Executions and cancellations over time 
The sample is the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity 
capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. 
Failure functions (cumulative probabilities of occurrence) for executions and cancellations of 
limit orders over time, estimated with the Kaplan-Meier correction for censoring. In estimating 
the function for execution, cancellation was treated as equivalent to censoring. In estimating the 




Figure 5. Nasdaq and Island Volume 
 
The sample is the 300 largest firms in the Nasdaq National Market (ranked by equity 
capitalization as of September 30, 1999), over the 64 trading days in the fourth quarter of 1999. 
The figures is based on Island ITCH and Nasdaq Nastraq data.  
 
 
 
